We develop a model of informational lobbying in which a policymaker must decide which issues to reform, but is uninformed about which issues he would be better o¤ reforming. On each issue there is an informed interest group that always favors the adoption of reform, and which can lobby the policymaker by o¤ering to provide veri…able information about the state of the world for its issue. A key feature of our model is that the policymaker faces time/resource constraints which may restrict both 1) his ability to grant access to and verify the information of all lobbying interest groups and 2) his ability to reform all issues. We show that when the policymaker can reform all issues, the act of lobbying by an interest group signals information only imperfectly. In particular, an interest group may want to lobby the policymaker even when it does not possess favorable information in the hope that the policymaker is unable to verify its information but still takes the act of lobbying as a signal that the state is favorable to reform. We call such lobbying behavior 'overlobbying'. We then show that a restriction on the number of issues on which reforms can be implemented, viz. an agenda constraint, can improve information transmission by eliminating overlobbying. Importantly, we identify circumstances in which an agenda constraint improves the ex ante welfare of the policymaker and of each interest group, leading to a Pareto improvement.
"HYPERACTIVITY is not a virtue in a legislature. Winston Churchill thought Parliament should meet for no more than …ve months a year. Texas enjoys relative freedom from red tape partly because its state legislature meets only every other year. If the European Parliament sat only once every two years, the continent's regulation-infested economy might well be healthier." [from the Economist (2014)]
INTRODUCTION
Lobbying of policymakers by special interest groups is pervasive under a diverse range of political systems around the world. Each year millions of dollars are spent on lobbying activities (for instance, in the US $3.24 bn were spent in the year 2014). 1 The o¢ ces of lobbying …rms are an integral …xture of the political power centres around the world, be it D.C., Brussels or Canberra. Critiques often attribute a politician's advocacy/opposition of a certain piece of legislation to his/her cozy relationship with one or the other lobby. It is therefore no surprise that the nature, extent and impact of lobbying are topics of popular debate as well as of extensive scrutiny among scholars.
While the popular imagination often paints lobbying as an attempt to seek rents, special favors or exemptions in exchange for money or other lures, 2 a recent political economy literature treats lobbying as an activity that, either directly or indirectly, transmits policy relevant information from special interest groups to the policymaker. For instance, the act of lobbying by an interest group can serve as a signal of the availability of favorable information, which in turn induces the politician to grant the interest group access so that the information may be obtained or veri…ed. While the source of this information is biased, a rational policymaker can, after accounting for such bias, make on average a better informed decision in the general interest. 3 This paper contributes to the literature on informational lobbying by developing a model of lobbying in which the policymaker (hereafter, PM) faces time/resource constraints in both the provision of access to interest groups and the formulation of policy. The PM is responsible for multiple issues on which he must decide whether to implement a reform or to keep the status quo. The PM's optimal policy depends on whether the state of the world on that issue is pro-reform or not. The PM is initially uninformed about the state of the world. On each issue there is an interest group (hereafter, IG) wanting its issue to be reformed irrespective of the state of the world. Each IG has veri…able information about the state of the world on the issue it is associated with and can lobby the PM at a cost. The PM must choose whether to grant a lobbying IG access (or study the information the IG provided when lobbying). If the PM grants an IG access, he learns the state of the world on the issue that the IG is associated with.
Thus, we construct a model in which there is potential for welfare-enhancing information transmission via lobbying and access. However, we incorporate a re-alistic aspect of the policymaking process, viz. time/resource constraints. 4 In particular, we assume that the PM has limited time and resources that must be rationed between multiple IGs. Also, we take into account the fact that in a time period (say, a legislative session) only a certain number of policies/legislations may be enacted. Speci…cally, in our baseline model we assume there are two issues but the PM can give access to only one IG. We then consider two possibilities: one, where the PM can enact reform on both issues; and two, where the PM can enact reform on only one issue. We will refer to the former case as one where there is no agenda constraint, and the latter as the case with an agenda constraint. 5 Our model makes several interesting points regarding the nature of informational lobbying in the presence/absence of constraints on access as well as agenda.
First, we characterize the equilibria of the model both with and without agenda constraint and study the extent to which lobbying can transmit policy relevant information to the PM. Intuitively, lobbying provides the PM information via two channels, direct and indirect. The direct channel operates via granting of access whereby the PM observes an IG's information on the state of the world for the issue the IG is associated with. The indirect channel operates via the signalling potential of lobbying. Since lobbying is costly and since there is a chance that the PM will grant the IG access and observe the IG's information, it is relatively more attractive for an IG to lobby when it has favorable information than when it has unfavorable information. Hence, the act of lobbying by an IG can serve as a signal that it has favorable information. The extent to which lobbying can thus serve as a signal of the true state of the world depends on two factors: one, the cost of lobbying; and two, the extent to which the PM is able, via access, to "discipline"the IGs to lobby truthfully, which depends on the agenda constraint. When the cost of lobbying is su¢ ciently high, or when the PM can credibly discipline the IGs (which happens in presence of an agenda constraint), we obtain a separating equilibrium wherein each IG lobbies if and only if it has favorable information. When this is the case, the PM gets fully informed. However, if the lobbying cost is low or the access strategies do not adequately act as a disciplining mechanism (which happens in the absence of an agenda constraint) then we get a semi-separating equilibrium. For instance, in the baseline model, we can get an overlobbying equilibrium wherein an IG sometimes lobbies even when it has unfavorable information. It does so hoping that it will not be granted access and the PM will still believe with a su¢ ciently high probability that the state of the world is pro-reform and, therefore, implement the reform with positive probability. 6 Second, we show that in the presence of an access constraint, the imposition 4 The existence of resource constraints in policymaking is self-evident. The existence of time constraints that lawmakers are exposed to, forcing them to prioritize issues and limiting the number of IGs they can grant access to and verify the information, are documented extensively in the literature. For example, Bauer, Dexter and De Sola Pool (1963; 405) writes: "The decisions most constantly on [a Congressman's] mind are not how to vote, but what to do with his time, how to allocate his resources, and where to put his energy." Hall (1996; 24) reports a legislative assistant saying: "He [the Congressman] had a con ‡ict, but the point is that members always have con ‡icts. They have to be in two places at once, so they have to choose: Which issue is more important to me?" Likewise, Jones and Baumgartner (2005; 147) writes: "The agenda space is severely limited, and many issues can compete for the attention of policymakers."of an agenda constraint can improve information transmission. Speci…cally, in our baseline model, there is a range of lobbying costs for which the unique equilibrium in the absence of agenda constraint involves overlobbying, whereas imposing the agenda constraint leads to a perfectly informative equilibrium. However, the presence of an agenda constraint also has its costs, since such constraint precludes the PM from reforming all issues. Hence the net e¤ect of an agenda constraint is ambiguous. However, we identify a range of parameter values for which the imposition of an agenda constraint improves the ex ante welfare of the PM as well as the ex ante welfare of every IG, thereby leading to a Pareto improvement. Thus, our model provides a rationale for institutional features (such as a restriction on the sitting time of a legislature per year) aimed at reducing legislative activity. It further illustrates that a reduction in legislative activity can be Pareto improving, not because it reduces wasteful rent seeking and bureaucratic red tape, as suggested in the quote from the Economist (2014) cited above, but because it improves IGs' information transmission to lawmakers.
Third, we show that our results extend in a natural way to a model with multiple issues. In that model we show that given an access constraint, there always exists a level of agenda constraint for which the PM gets perfectly informed in equilibrium and such equilibrium can lead to Pareto improvement relative to the case without an agenda constraint.
Fourth, we extend our model to allow the PM to have subpoena power, which gives the PM the option to access the information of an IG irrespective of whether the IG chooses to lobby or not. Subpoena power is shown to have two e¤ects: one, it allows the PM to obtain information which he could not otherwise obtain; two, it lowers the incentives of IGs to lobby when they have favorable information. We show that the latter e¤ect weakly dominates the former, and hence the introduction of subpoena power does not improve overall information transmission and the PM's ex ante welfare.
Finally, our baseline model takes the existence of the IGs as given and assumes that the IGs are pro-reform. In a supplementary online appendix we provide the microfoundations of our model and show that the set-up we consider is indeed consistent with the equilibrium of a more general game with endogenous formation of IGs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the most relevant literature. Section 3 presents our baseline model. Section 4 provides a numerical example that illustrates our main results and the intuition underlying them. Section 5 provides the full analysis of our baseline model. Section 6 considers various extensions to our baseline model. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix. A supplementary online appendix studies extensions to the model and provides details of the proofs and calculations underlying our examples omitted in the paper.
RELATED LITERATURE
The novelty of our paper is to study informational lobbying in the presence of both an access constraint and an agenda constraint. Neither of the papers mentioned below (and, to our knowledge, no other existing paper) considers these two types of constraints simultaneously. Some of these papers consider a policy choice on a single issue, meaning that they cannot consider the possibility of an agenda constraint. Others consider a policy choice on multiple issues, but either deny the PM the ability to grant access and/or verify IGs'information, or consider IGs'production of public information, which would be equivalent to removing any access constraint in our setting.
Our paper is related to an extensive literature on informational lobbying and persuasion. Potters and van Winden (1992) and Lohmann (1993 Lohmann ( , 1995 are early contributions that model IG in ‡uence as a signalling game, where IGs are endowed with non-veri…able information that they can convey, at least in part, to a PM via a combination of cheap talk and costly signalling. Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) and Rasmusen (1993) model IGs'decisions to produce and convey veri…able information as well as the PM's decision to verify, at a cost, the information conveyed by IGs. All these papers di¤er from ours in that the source of ine¢ ciency they identify lies in the ability of IGs to deceive the PM by telling him lies. Deception is not allowed in our setting where IGs can withhold information (by not lobbying) but cannot tamper with it. 7 By contrast, the source of ine¢ ciency that we identify lies in the agenda constraint and the access constraint, which are absent in all these papers. Furthermore, our paper contrasts with Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) and Rasmusen (1993) in that the latter two take as exogenously given the cost for the PM to verify an IG's information, while we endogenize it by taking account of the access constraint. More speci…cally, the cost of awarding access to an IG and verifying its information is, in our setting, an opportunity cost that corresponds to the value of the information the PM could obtain by instead granting access and verifying the information of another IG. Milgrom (1981) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) introduce games of persuasion, in which a special interest endowed with information seeks to in ‡uence a decision maker by choosing which pieces of information to convey truthfully to the decision maker and which pieces of information to withhold from him. 8 We adopt the framework of persuasion games, modelling IGs'decisions whether to withhold information (by not lobbying) or to reveal it truthfully (when lobbying and being granted access). Lagerlöf (1997) considers a game of persuasion in which an IG chooses to collect veri…able information and whether to reveal or to withhold it from a PM. Like us, Lagerlöf identi…es a possibility for a Pareto improvement. However, the nature and the source of the Pareto improvement are di¤erent. In Lagerlöf (1997) the source of the Pareto improvement lies in: 1) the PM's inability to observe directly the information collection decision of the IG, resulting in the IG collecting on average too much information; and 2) the PM caring about the IG's payo¤. In this context, banning informational lobbying has therefore the potential to generate a Pareto improvement. By contrast, our PM knows that IGs are informed (although he does not know which information IGs have). In our paper, the source of the Pareto improvement lies instead in the precision of the information contained in the lobbying decision of each IG. Introducing a constraint on the agenda can improve information transmission and, in circumstances we identify 7 Some scholars argue that deception rarely occurs in practice. This is because, as Hansen (1991), Berry (1997) and Ainsworth (2002) observe, IGs must build and preserve a reputation for reliability in order to keep access to lawmakers and maintain their ability to in ‡uence policy choices. 8 Brocas and Carrillo (2007), Brocas, Carrillo and Palfrey (2012), Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) are relatively recent papers presenting models of persuasion in which a special interest decides how much public information to produce before a decision maker takes an action. Beyond considering a policy choice on a single issue, these papers di¤er from ours in that they consider settings where information is public and, therefore, symmetric. In our setting, information is private to the IGs and, therefore, asymmetric. below, generates a Pareto improvement. 9 Our paper is also related to a small literature on lobbying and access. AustenSmith (1995 AustenSmith ( , 1998 and Cotton (2009 Cotton ( , 2012 consider models in which IGs make monetary contributions, not in exchange for policy favors, as considered in many contributions on IG in ‡uence, 10 but instead in the hope of securing access and present their information to the PM.
11 ;12 All these papers di¤er from ours in two related ways. First, all these papers endogenize the cost of access which takes the form either of monetary contributions that IGs choose to make to the PM in the hope of securing access, or of an access price set by the PM. By contrast, in our setting the cost that an IG must incur in the hope of gaining access to the PM takes the form of a lobbying cost that is exogenously given (e.g., the cost of setting an o¢ ce in D.C. or hiring a lobbyist); hence, in our setting, there is no payment of monetary contributions to the PM. Second, in all these papers access has a monetary value for the PM while, in our setting, access has only an informational value since IGs make no monetary contributions to the PM.
Finally, our paper is related to a vast strand of literature in which a PM (or, more generally, a decision maker) chooses how to allocate scarce time and resources (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) ). Esteban and Ray (2006) considers a model in which a PM must allocate a limited number of licenses to …rms that di¤er in their productivity and their wealth. Wealth and productivity are private information. Firms seek to signal their productivity by devoting resources toward lobbying. However, the double-dimensional information asymmetry, on productivity and on wealth, can jam the signal since wealthier …rms are able to devote more resources toward lobbying than less-wealthy …rms of equal, or higher, productivity. As in our paper, Esteban and Ray consider a multidimensional policy choice, with a constraint on the agenda, and …nd that IG in ‡uence can lead to ine¢ cient policymaking. However, the source of ine¢ ciency is di¤erent in the two papers. In Esteban and Ray (2006) , the ine¢ ciency comes from the double-dimensional information asymmetry, on productivity and on wealth, which is not present in our paper. By contrast, in our paper, the ine¢ ciency comes from the access constraint that induces IGs to overlobby, thereby jamming the signal contained in lobbying decisions, which is not present in Esteban and Ray (2006) where the PM cannot grant access to IGs.
Cotton and Dellis (2016) considers a model of informational lobbying in which 9 Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002, 2006) , Yu (2005) and Porteiro (2008a, 2008b ) are other papers on IG in ‡uence that adopt the framework of persuasion games. These papers di¤er from ours in several important ways. First, they all consider a single IG which can always get access and convey its information if it chooses to do so, thereby ignoring the constraint on access which is at the heart of our analysis. Second, Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002) considers policymaking in a legislative assembly, not by a single PM as we do. Third, Yu (2005) , Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) and Porteiro (2008a, 2008b) all study the IG's choice between conveying information and/or making monetary contributions in exchange for policy favors. The possibility for monetary contributions is absent from our setting.
1 0 See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (2002) for a review of the vast literature that models IG in ‡uence as quid pro quo exchanges of monetary contributions for policy favors. 1 1 These papers di¤er, among other things, in the nature of information they consider. In Austen-Smith (1995) information is non-veri…able. In Cotton (2009) information can be withheld from the PM but cannot be tampered with. In Austen-Smith (1998) and Cotton (2012) , as in our paper, information consists of hard evidence that can be neither tampered with nor withheld once access is granted. 1 2 Langbein (1986) and Wright (1990) , among others, provide evidence that is consistent with the idea that monetary contributions by IGs serve to buy access, with the purpose of presenting information to lawmakers. a PM can reform only a limited number of issues. However, the PM is uninformed about which issues are the most pressing and/or bene…cial to reform, but can exert e¤ort to learn about the alternative reforms before choosing policy. Next to the PM there are single-issue-minded IGs, which can likewise collect information about the merits of reforming their respective issue. 13 Cotton and Dellis show that even pure informational lobbying (viz. in the absence of monetary contributions and evidence distortion or withholding) can be harmful to citizens'welfare since IGs advocating a priori less-appealing reforms have an incentive to collect information on their reform. IGs'information collection has the e¤ect of weakening the PM's incentives to learn about other issues and can induce him to shift his priorities to issues that are less important for his constituents. As in our paper, Cotton and Dellis consider a multidimensional policy choice with a constraint on the agenda, and …nd that informational lobbying can lead to ine¢ cient policymaking. However, the source of ine¢ ciency is di¤erent in the two papers. In Cotton and Dellis (2016) , where information is symmetric, ine¢ ciency comes from the e¤ect that IG information collection has on the PM's own information collection decision. In our paper, where the PM cannot collect information on his own, ine¢ ciency comes from the access constraint and the information asymmetry between the PM and the IGs.
Less closely related to our paper are contributions that look at the e¤ect of elections on politicians'decisions on how to allocate scarce resources. Dellis (2009) shows how electoral concerns can induce an incumbent to address a di¤erent set of issues than he would in the absence of electoral concerns; his purpose is to manipulate the set of issues that will be salient in the next election. Daley and Snowberg (2014) shows how candidates, whose abilities are private information, may devote a limited amount of time toward fund-raising rather than policymaking, in an e¤ort at signalling their ability.
BASELINE MODEL
We develop our argument using a simple model of access. In section 6 and the supplementary online appendix we generalize our argument and investigate the robustness of our conclusions.
We consider a PM who must choose policy on two issues, indexed by i = 1; 2.
14 We denote a policy by p = (p 1 ; p 2 ), where p i 2 f0; 1g is the policy on issue i. Policy p i = 1 corresponds to the adoption of a reform project or the realization of a public investment on issue i. Policy p i = 0 corresponds to keeping the status quo. There are two possible states of the world on each issue. We denote the state on issue i by i 2 f0; 1g. State i = 1 corresponds to circumstances in which the PM bene…ts from reforming issue i. State i = 0 corresponds to circumstances in which the PM bene…ts from keeping the status quo on this issue. States are independent across issues. The realized state = ( 1 ; 2 ) is unknown to the PM, but its distribution is common knowledge: i = 1 with probability i 2 0;
0 with probability 1 i .
Given policy p = (p 1 ; p 2 ) and state = ( 1 ; 2 ), the PM gets utility
where > 1 represents the importance of issue 1 relative to issue 2, 15 and
represents the PM's utility over issue i. Hence, for each issue i, the PM prefers that the policy p i coincides with the realized state i , which makes information on i valuable to the PM. There are two IGs, each one representing a separate issue. Given policy p = (p 1 ; p 2 ), the IG involved with issue i (henceforth, IG i ) gets utility v i (p i ) = p i , meaning that IG i seeks to maximize the probability that p i = 1, regardless of the state i .
Each IG i has veri…able evidence about i , and decides whether to lobby the PM. 16 If IG i decides to lobby, it bears a utility cost f i 2 (0; 1) and, if granted access by the PM, must reveal i . 17 ;18 The PM faces a time constraint that prevents him from granting access to more than one IG.
We are interested in studying the implications of a second constraint, namely, a constraint on the agenda. 19 For this purpose, we shall compare two games, one in which the PM is not constrained on his agenda and can implement both reform projects if he wishes to, and another game in which the PM is constrained on his agenda and can implement only one reform project. We denote by N 2 f1; 2g the maximum number of reform projects the PM can adopt. We shall call N -game the game in which the PM can adopt up to N reform projects.
The policymaking process has four stages. At stage 0, Nature chooses the state i for each issue i and reveals it only to IG i . At stage 1 IGs decide simultaneously whether or not to lobby the PM. At stage 2 the PM observes IGs'lobbying decisions and chooses to which IG, if any, he grants access. If IG i is granted access, it must reveal i to the PM. Finally, at stage 3 the PM chooses policy. We now describe the structure of each stage, working backwards. 1 5 Assuming > 1 is made to simplify exposition. Similar qualitative conclusions are obtained if we allow for = 1. 1 6 Lobbying can be interpreted in several ways. First, it can be interpreted as the IG knocking at the door of the PM or calling him in order to secure an appointment or a spot at a committee hearing at which the IG will be able to present evidence on its issue. Alternatively, lobbying can be interpreted as the IG preparing a report on its issue and bringing the report to the PM for him to read. In the latter interpretation, access can be interpreted as the decision by the PM to read the report provided by the IG. 1 7 Conclusions are qualitatively similar if lobbying is costless but there is a penalty f i that IG i must bear if it lobbies and is granted access when i = 0 (e.g., f i would be a reputation cost). 1 8 Thus, when granted access, an IG cannot hide or distort evidence. For example, in some countries witnesses must take an oath before testifying in front of a legislative committee. Results are similar if an IG can withhold, but not alter, evidence; in equilibrium an IG with favorable evidence would choose to reveal it with probability one, when granted access (Milgrom and Roberts (1986) ). 1 9 For example, a budget constraint may prevent the PM from realizing the public investment project on each issue, and must therefore choose which one of the two investment projects (if any) he will realize. Alternatively, a time constraint may prevent the PM from addressing every single issue landing on his desk, forcing him to ignore at least one of the two issues. Jones and Baumgartner (2005) 
Stage 3: Policy choice
By the time the PM chooses policy, he has observed the lobbying decisions of the IGs and the realized state for the issue advocated by the IG that was granted access (if any). We denote IG i 's lobbying decision by`i, where`i = 1 if IG i has lobbied and`i = 0 otherwise. 20 We denote the PM's access decision with respect to IG i by a i , where a i = 1 if the PM has granted access to IG i and a i = 0 otherwise. Given pro…les of lobbying decisions`= (`1;`2) and of access decisions a = (a 1 ; a 2 ), the PM forms belief i (`i; a i ; i ) that i = 1, using Bayes'rule whenever possible. To lighten notation, we write i as a shorthand for i (`i; a i ; i ) when this does not create confusion.
A policy choice strategy for the PM is a mapping
where ( 1 ; 2 ) (`; a) speci…es the probability that the PM chooses policy p 1 = 1 and policy p 2 = 1, respectively.
21
The PM maximizes his expected utility with policy choice strategy i (`; a)
when N = 2, and i (`; a)
when N = 1, where 1 and 2 = 1, and with the restriction that
Thus, when there is no agenda constraint (N = 2) the PM adopts the reform on issue i if he believes i = 1 is more likely than i = 0. When there is an agenda constraint (N = 1) the PM adopts the reform on issue i if, again, he believes that i = 1 is more likely than i = 0 and, moreover, the expected utility gain from adopting the reform on issue i exceeds the expected utility gain from adopting the reform on the other issue. The latter implies that when N = 2 the PM's policy choice on issue i depends on his belief (and thus on his information) on only i , while when N = 1 it depends on his beliefs (and thus on his information) on both 1 and 2 .
Stage 2: Access
The PM chooses whether to grant access to an IG and, if so, which one. In the baseline model we consider the case where the PM can grant access to an IG only if it did lobby.
2 0 Alternatively, we could model each IG i 's lobbying decision as sending a message m i 2 f0; 1; ;g, where m i = 0 (resp. m i = 1) would correspond to a message that i = 0 (resp. i = 1) and m i = ; would correspond to the situation where IG i does not bear the lobbying cost f i and sends no message. This would slightly complicate the analysis while generating the same conclusions since, in equilibrium, no IG chooses to bear the lobbying cost to send a message m i = 0. 2 1 In order to lighten notation, we omit strategies' dependency on N , the maximum number of reform projects the PM can adopt. Likewise, we omit from the notation describing PM's posterior beliefs, i s, and policy choices, i s.
By the time the PM chooses to which IG he grants access, he has observed the lobbying decisions of the two IGs. Given IG i 's lobbying decision`i, the PM forms belief (`i) when this does not create confusion.
An access strategy for the PM is a mapping
where ( 1 ; 2 ) (`) speci…es the probability that the PM grants access to IG 1 and to IG 2 , respectively, given a pro…le of lobbying decisions`= (`1;`2). The PM's access decision is straightforward if at least one IG did not lobby. If neither IG lobbied, the PM cannot grant access to any of them, and so 1 (0; 0) = 2 (0; 0) = 0. If only one IG did lobby, the PM can grant access only to that IG, in which case we have 1 (1; 0) = 2 (0; 1) = 1 and 1 (0; 1) = 2 (1; 0) = 0.
We now consider the more interesting case where the two IGs did lobby (i.e., = (1; 1)). In this case, the PM chooses an access strategy that solves ( max
is the PM's expected utility. W i ( ) denotes the probability with which the PM believes he will make the correct policy choice on issue i if he grants access to IG i , and Z i ( ) denotes the same probability if he does not grant access to IG i . The expressions for W i ( ) and Z i ( ) are given in a supplementary online appendix. We de…ne X i ( ) W i ( ) Z i ( ) as the increase in the probability that the PM will make the correct policy choice on issue i by granting access to IG i . The PM's access strategy when both IGs lobby is given by i (1; 1)
with the restriction that P 2 i=1 i (1; 1) = 1. Thus, when both IGs lobby, the PM chooses to grant access to the IG which information has the highest expected value for him.
Stage 1: Lobbying
A lobbying strategy for IG i is a mapping
where i ( i ) speci…es the probability that IG i lobbies the PM.
IG i chooses a lobbying strategy that solves
where Ep i ( i ( i ) ; i ; ; ) is the probability that p i = 1.
Equilibrium
The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Roughly speaking, an equilibrium consists of a strategy pro…le f ( ) ; ( ) ; ( )g and a system of beliefs n Acc ( ) ; ( ) o such that: 1) the strategy pro…le is sequentially rational given the system of beliefs; and 2) the beliefs are obtained from the strategies using Bayes' rule whenever possible.
The …niteness of the game implies that an equilibrium exists in each of the two games, the N = 1-game and the N = 2-game. In case of equilibrium multiplicity, we shall focus attention on most informative equilibria, a standard re…nement in the literature.
Extensions
In order to make our argument as simple as possible, we have made a series of assumptions. In section 6 and a supplementary online appendix we generalize our argument along several dimensions and investigate the robustness of our conclusions. First, we consider a setting with an arbitrary, …nite number of issues I 2. Second, we endogenize the set of IGs by adding a preliminary stage at which each IG decides whether to organize or, equivalently, whether to acquire information about the realized state for its issue. Third, we grant the PM with subpoena power, allowing him to award access to an IG whether it did lobby or not.
AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this section we present the main qualitative results of our model by means of an illustrative example. The example characterizes equilibrium for the game without agenda constraint (N = 2) and for the game with agenda constraint (N = 1). We show, for some parameters values, that agenda constraint results in better information transmission in equilibrium. Speci…cally, we show that agenda constraint leads to truthful lobbying by the IGs, leading to the PM becoming fully informed, whereas placing no constraint on the agenda leads to an equilibrium in which there is "overlobbying" which prevents the PM from becoming fully informed. 22 Moreover, we show that the equilibrium outcome of the game with agenda constraint Pareto-dominates the equilibrium outcome of the game without agenda constraint.
Here we provide the numerical results to highlight these points along with the intuition behind our derivations; detailed calculations can be found in the supplementary online appendix. Consider the following parameters values: = 2, i.e., the PM …nds issue 1 twice as important as issue 2, 1 = 2 = 2=5, i.e., the PM is ex ante biased against reforms (since i < 1=2), and the lobbying cost for each IG is f = 1=20.
Game without agenda constraint (N = 2)
We will …rst establish that any equilibrium of the game without agenda constraint cannot lead to full information revelation. To see this, assume by way of contradiction that such an equilibrium were to exist. In this case lobbying must be truthful, as we will show in section 5. Let b i 2 [0; 1] denote the equilibrium probability with which IG i is granted access when both IGs lobby, with the restriction that b 1 + b 2 = 1. Given truthful lobbying, in equilibrium the PM's interim beliefs are such that if IG i lobbies (does not lobby), then he believes i = 1 (0). It follows that, if an IG lobbies but is not granted access, the PM chooses to reform its issue. IG i 's expected policy payo¤ from lobbying when i = 0 is then equal to 2=5 b i , which corresponds to the probability that IG i lobbies and is granted access: For IG i to not deviate and lobby when i = 0, it must be that 2=5 b i 1=20, i.e., the expected policy gain from lobbying must not exceed the lobbying cost. This inequality is satis…ed for each i = 1; 2 only if b i 1=8 for i = 1; 2, which contradicts
Next, we assert that there is a unique equilibrium of the game without agenda constraint which has the following strategies and beliefs: 23 1. The lobbying strategies are given by i (1) = 1 for each i = 1; 2, 1 (0) = 2=9 and 2 (0) = 2=3, i.e., IG i always lobbies when it has favorable information and randomizes between lobbying and not lobbying when it has unfavorable information. 2. The access strategy is such that when both IGs lobby, 1 (1; 1) = 15=16 and 2 (1; 1) = 1=16, i.e., the PM randomizes between granting access to the IGs; IG 1 is granted access with a (much) higher probability. When only one IG lobbies, it is granted access with probability one. When neither IG lobbies, the PM cannot grant access to any IG. To get the intuition behind why the above strategies and beliefs constitute an equilibrium, let's focus on the PM's optimal actions when both IGs lobby. 24 IG 1 's lobbying strategy is such that whenever IG 1 lobbies, the PM believes with a su¢ ciently high probability that 1 = 1; and therefore, if IG 1 were not granted access, the PM implements reform on issue 1. On the other hand, lobbying strategy of IG 2 is not su¢ ciently informative, and therefore, if IG 2 were not granted access, the PM is indi¤erent between implementing and not implementing reform on issue 2. Hence, when both IGs lobby, the PM has two strategies to consider: 1) grant access to IG 1 , choose the correct policy on issue 1 and randomize between reform and status quo on issue 2; 2) grant access to IG 2 , choose the correct policy on issue 2 and implement reform on issue 1. Given the parameters values and the lobbying frequencies chosen in equilibrium, it can be shown that these two strategies yield identical payo¤, 5/2. It is therefore optimal for the PM to randomize between the two, speci…cally, to choose 1 (1; 1) = 15=16 and 2 (1; 1) = 1=16:
We can then verify that, given the mixed access and policy strategies employed by the PM, each IG i prefers to lobby when i = 1 and is indi¤erent between lobbying and not lobbying when i = 0; which makes it optimal to play a mixed lobbying strategy in state 0, speci…cally, 1 (0) = 2=9 and 2 (0) = 2=3:
We calculate the equilibrium ex-ante expected payo¤s of the two IGs and the PM and can show them to be the following:
Game with agenda constraint (N = 1)
We now show that there exists an equilibrium for the game with agenda constraint (N = 1) in which the PM gets perfectly informed about . (This is true in any equilibrium, as established in lemma 2.) This illustrates our result that an agenda constraint can lead to better information transmission (proposition 1).
Suppose the IGs choose truthful lobbying strategies, i.e., for i = 1; 2; i (1) = 1 and i (0) = 0: Suppose the PM chooses 1 (1; 1) = 1, i.e., he grants access to IG 1 when both IGs lobby. 25 If both IGs lobby and 1 = 1; then the PM chooses reform only on issue 1; if both IGs lobby and 1 = 0; then the PM implements reform only on issue 2.
To show that these strategies constitute an equilibrium, it remains to establish that truthful lobbying is an optimal strategy for both IGs. Observe that issue i does not get reformed when i = 0, implying that IG i has no incentive to deviate and lobby in this state. When 1 = 1, IG 1 gets payo¤ 1 1=20 = 19=20 from lobbying (i.e., it gets p 1 = 1 and must bear lobbying cost f = 1=20). When 2 = 1, IG 2 gets expected payo¤ 3=5 1=20 = 11=20 from lobbying (i.e., it gets p 2 = 1 when 1 = 0, which happens with probability 3/5, and must bear lobbying cost f = 1=20). Since each IG gets zero payo¤ if it does not lobby (p i = 0 since Acc i (0) = 0), neither IG i wants to deviate and not lobby when i = 1.
To sum up, through lobbying decisions the PM gets perfectly informed about . He always chooses the correct p 1 . He also chooses the correct p 2 unless = (1; 1), in which case the agenda constraint is binding and the PM reforms issue 1, while keeping the status quo for issue 2. We show equilibrium expected payo¤s for the PM and the IGs to be
Pareto improvement
Comparing equilibrium expected payo¤s in the two games, we get
Thus, IG 1 is ex ante as well o¤ in the N = 1-game as in the N = 2-game, while IG 2 and the PM are each ex ante strictly better o¤ in the former than in the latter. This illustrates our second result that, from an ex ante point of view, the introduction of an agenda constraint can generate a Pareto improvement (proposition 2). Note that it is not a priori clear that introduction of an agenda constraint could lead to Pareto improvement, nor does it lead to such improvement for all parameter values. Intuitively, there are costs and bene…ts of imposing an agenda constraint for the PM as well as the IGs. The downside is that agenda constraint reduces the choice set of the PM, and therefore reduces the chance that a reform is implemented. On the positive side, agenda constraint can provide the PM with a tool to credibly discipline the IGs to truthfully reveal information through their lobbying decisions. This may not only bene…t the PM but may also bene…t the IGs by saving them the costs associated with overlobbying. Under a range of parameter values, the bene…ts are greater than the costs for all three players, giving us Pareto improvement. In section 5.3 we provide the precise conditions under which this occurs.
GENERAL RESULTS
We now analyze the baseline model described in section 3. First, we describe the equilibrium sets in the two games, the N = 1-game and the N = 2-game. Second, we compare equilibrium information transmission in the two games. Finally, we identify the region of the parameter space where the introduction of an agenda constraint generates a Pareto improvement.
Equilibrium sets
In this subsection, we characterize the (most informative) equilibrium in each game.
Game without agenda constraint
We start by considering the game without agenda constraint (N = 2). As we showed in section 3, the policy choice on issue i depends only on the PM's belief on that issue, i (`i; a i ). Given this observation, and to lighten notation, we shall write i (`i; a i ) in place of i (`; a).
Our …rst lemma describes equilibria of this game. (1)
Thus, truthful lobbying can be supported in equilibrium of the N = 2-game if and only if lobbying is su¢ ciently costly, in the sense that 1f1+ 2f2 1 2
1.
To see why, suppose both IGs lobby truthfully. At the access stage, the PM believes i = 1 (resp. i = 0) if he observes IG i lobbying (resp. not lobbying). For truthful lobbying to be supported in equilibrium, IG i must not want to deviate and lobby when i = 0. If IG i does not lobby, it cannot be granted access, and the PM believes i = 0 and chooses p i = 0. If IG i lobbies when i = 0, the PM chooses p i = 1 if and only if he grants access to the other IG, IG i . This event occurs with probability i i (1; 1) , viz. the probability that IG i lobbies times the probability that IG i is granted access when both IGs lobby. Thus, IG i does not deviate from its truthful lobbying strategy when i = 0 if and only if the expected gain does not exceed the lobbying cost, i.e., 1. When lobbying is su¢ ciently costly to support truthful lobbying in equilibrium (case 1 of lemma 1), lobbying decisions reveal and the PM chooses p = .
When lobbying is not su¢ ciently costly to support truthful lobbying in equilibrium (case 2 of lemma 1), there is a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, each IG overlobbies, i.e., lobbies with probability one when it has favorable information, and randomizes between lobbying and not lobbying when it has unfavorable information. An IG randomizes between lobbying and not lobbying only if it is indi¤erent between taking any of these two actions. Observe that an IG i gets zero payo¤ if it does not lobby; this happens because Acc i (0) = 0, since IG i abstains from lobbying only when i = 0, which induces the PM to choose p i = 0. This means that IG i must get zero expected payo¤ when it lobbies in state i = 0. This occurs if IG i lobbies with a probability such that, in expectation, all the rent from overlobbying is exhausted.
In the case of IG 2 , this imposes two requirements. A …rst requirement is that the PM is indi¤erent between choosing p 2 = 1 and p 2 = 0 when IG 2 lobbies but is not granted access. This happens if and only if (1) = 1=2, which pins down a precise value for 2 (0). A second requirement is that the PM randomizes in a precise way between p 2 = 1 and p 2 = 0, which pins down a precise value for 2 (1; 0).
In the case of IG 1 , this imposes that, when both IGs lobby, the PM randomizes in a precise way between granting access to IG 1 and granting access to IG 2 . This pins down a precise value for 1 (1; 1) . Moreover, the PM randomizes on access if and only if the value of the information he expects to get from IG 1 is the same as the value of the information he expects to get from IG 2 . Given (1) = 1=2, the expected value of the information from IG 2 equals 1/2. At the same time, the expected value of the information from IG 1 equals
. 27 The condition h 1 (1) and, in turn, for 1 (0). Furthermore, we can infer from this equality that Acc 1
(1) > 1=2, given > 1 and (1) 1=2, the latter since otherwise IG 1 would not want to lobby when 1 = 0.
28 It follows from Acc 1
(1) > 1=2 that 1 (1; 0) = 1. 
Game with agenda constraint
We continue by considering the game with agenda constraint (N = 1). Our second lemma describes equilibrium lobbying strategies in this game. Thus, equilibria of the N = 1-game involve truthful lobbying if lobbying is not too costly (case 2 of lemma 2). To understand the intuition, suppose that both IGs lobby truthfully. In this case, lobbying decisions perfectly reveal , which renders the PM indi¤erent between granting access to IG 1 and granting access to IG 2 . Thus, the PM can follow a strategy that prioritizes issue 1, i.e., that grants access to IG 1 whenever it lobbies and that adopts p 1 = 1 if and only if IG 1 reveals 1 = 1.
Given this strategy of the PM, IG 1 does not want to deviate from truthful lobbying. To see this, note that when IG 1 does not lobby, the PM believes 1 = 0 ( Acc 1 (0) = 0) and chooses p 1 = 0. 1. When 1 = 1, IG 1 does not want to deviate and not lobby since it gets p 1 = 1 when lobbying, 30 while it would get p 1 = 0 if it were to not lobby. 2. When 1 = 0, IG 1 does not want to deviate and lobby since IG 1 would then be granted access and would have to reveal 1 = 0, leading the PM to choose p 1 = 0, exactly as when IG 1 does not lobby. Likewise, IG 2 does not want to deviate from truthful lobbying. This happens because IG 2 is awarded access when the PM considers the possibility of adopting p 2 = 1. More speci…cally, when IG 2 does not lobby, the PM believes 2 = 0 ( Acc 2 (0) = 0) and chooses p 2 = 0. 1. When 2 = 0, IG 2 does not want to deviate and lobby since the PM considers adopting p 2 = 1 only when IG 1 does not lobby (which, given IG 1 's truthful strategy, means that the PM then believes 1 = 0). In this case, if IG 2 were to lobby, it would be granted access and would have to reveal 2 = 0, leading the PM to choose p 2 = 0, exactly as when IG 2 does not lobby. Given that lobbying is costly, IG 2 is then strictly better o¤ not lobbying.
the PM would believe 1 = 0 to be more likely than 1 = 1. In either case, the PM would choose p 1 = 0, which would be the same policy outcome as if IG 1 were not lobbying. Since lobbying is costly, IG 1 would not want to lobby. 2 9 Other equilibrium strategies and beliefs are described in the proof of the lemma. 3 0 IG 1 is awarded access with probability one, reveals 1 = 1 and, since > 1, the PM chooses p = (1; 0).
2. When 2 = 1, if IG 2 lobbies, it gets p 2 = 1 with probability 1 1 , i.e., the probability that IG 1 does not lobby. Thus, IG 2 does not want to deviate and not lobby if and only if the expected gain from lobbying is at least as large as the lobbying cost, i.e., f 2 1
1 . Observe that truthful lobbying implies that, in equilibrium, the PM chooses p = (1; 0) when = (1; 1), and p = otherwise.
Finally, when lobbying is su¢ ciently costly for IG 2 (case 1 of lemma 2), only one IG lobbies in equilibrium. Being the only lobbying IG, it lobbies truthfully since it expects to be granted access if it lobbies. 31 
Summing up
To sum up, when lobbying costs are su¢ ciently low, equilibrium lobbying is truthful in the N = 1-game, while IGs overlobby in the N = 2-game. The key di¤erence between these two games lies in the fact that the agenda constraint allows the PM to better "discipline" the lobbying behavior of IGs by following a strategy where he adopts p i = 1 only if IG i lobbies and reveals i = 1 when granted access. In the N = 2-game, the PM cannot follow such strategies since he would want to deviate and choose p i = 1 when both IGs lobby and he grants access to IG i , not to IG i . When lobbying is not too costly, IG i would then want to deviate and lobby in state i = 0, implying that truthful lobbying cannot be supported.
Comparing information transmission
In this section we compare equilibrium information transmission in the two games. For this purpose, we compare the PM's equilibrium posterior beliefs (focusing on most-informative equilibria in case of equilibrium multiplicity). We write 
with an equality for i = 1 and a strict inequality for i = 2.
1=2
for each i = 1; 2.
, an equilibrium exists in which IG 1 is the lobbying IG (and, being the only lobbying IG, it does so truthfully). An equilibrium in which IG 2 is the lobbying IG requires restrictive out-of-equilibrium beliefs. As a result, in the rest of the paper we shall focus on the equilibrium in which IG 1 lobbies truthfully and IG 2 does not lobby.
for each i = 1; 2, with a strict inequality for some .
Thus, when lobbying is costly for IG 2 (case 1 of proposition 1), the PM gets better informed about when N = 2 than when N = 1. The reverse is true when lobbying is not too costly for IG 2 (case 3 of proposition 1), the PM getting better informed when N = 1 than when N = 2. For intermediate cases, the PM gets perfectly informed whether N = 1 or N = 2.
To understand this result, observe that when N = 2 the PM gets the better informed the more costly lobbying is. This is because a higher lobbying cost helps discipline IGs and prevents excessive lobbying (in the form of overlobbying). By contrast, when N = 1 the PM gets better informed the less costly lobbying is. This is because a lower lobbying cost helps induce IG 2 to lobby (truthfully) and prevents insu¢ cient lobbying (in the form of IG 2 abstaining from lobbying). The key features underlying this di¤erence between N = 1 and N = 2 are that an IG's incentives to lobby: 1) decrease with the lobbying cost, and 2) are stronger when N = 2 than when N = 1.
When N = 1, the PM can support truthful lobbying by acting 'lexicographically', awarding access priority to IG 1 and adopting p 1 = 1 if and only if IG 1 reveals 1 = 1. When lobbying is not too costly, the two IGs lobby truthfully and the PM gets perfectly informed about . As lobbying becomes more costly, the net gain of lobbying for IG 2 decreases, up to a point where it becomes negative. Once a threshold is crossed (viz. 1 1 ), IG 2 stops lobbying, and the PM no longer gets from IG 2 any information on 2 .
When N = 2, the PM cannot follow the same strategies as when N = 1. This is because when N = 2, the PM can choose to reform both issues, something he cannot do when N = 1. When lobbying is costly, even a small probability of being granted access is su¢ cient to 'discipline' an IG, deterring it from deviating from truthful lobbying. As lobbying becomes less costly, the probability of being granted access must increase to still deter an IG from deviating and lobbying when it has unfavorable information. Once a threshold is crossed (viz. 1 1 f1 2 ), it is no longer possible to 'discipline'IGs. IGs overlobby, and the PM is no longer perfectly informed about .
To sum up, the PM gets better informed: 1) in the N = 1-game, when lobbying costs are low; and 2) in the N = 2-game, when lobbying costs are high.
Pareto-improving agenda constraint
In this section, we identify the region of the parameter space where the introduction of an agenda constraint generates a Pareto improvement. 
1:
To understand this result, observe that an agenda constraint imposes a cost by limiting the choice set of the PM. The introduction of an agenda constraint can therefore generate a Pareto improvement only if it creates a bene…t that counterbalances this agenda constraint cost. In our setting, the bene…t must be coming from information transmission. We already know from proposition 1 that an agenda constraint leads in equilibrium to a better informed PM if and only if lobbying costs are su¢ ciently low (case 3 of proposition 1). Thus, only in those circumstances can the PM not su¤er from an agenda constraint. We can therefore restrict attention to this case when searching for a Pareto-improving agenda constraint.
We start by observing that IG 1 is ex ante as well o¤ whether there is an agenda constraint or not. This is true for each state 1 . Speci…cally, 1. when 1 = 1, IG 1 lobbies with probability one and gets p 1 = 1 in both games. 2. when 1 = 0, IG 1 does not lobby and gets p 1 = 0 in the N = 1-game. In the N = 2-game, IG 1 overlobbies up to the point where it is indi¤erent between lobbying and not lobbying. In each game IG 1 's expected payo¤ is equal to zero. We continue by observing that IG 2 is ex ante (weakly) better o¤ with an agenda constraint than without. 32 On the one hand, the agenda constraint creates a cost for IG 2 since the PM prioritizes issue 1, IG 2 thus getting p 2 = 1 only if 1 = 0. On the other hand, the agenda constraint eliminates a negative externality that IG 2 imposes on itself by overlobbying. To see this, consider each state 2 , one at a time.
1. When 2 = 0, IG 2 gets zero expected payo¤ whether N = 1 or N = 2. The logic is similar to the one for IG 1 when 1 = 0. 2. Consider the case where 2 = 1.
In the N = 1-game, IG 2 gets p 2 = 1 only with probability 1 1 , i.e., if and only if 1 = 0. This re ‡ects the agenda constraint cost imposed to IG 2 . Speci…cally, IG 2 can get its reform adopted only when the PM does not want to adopt the reform on issue 1. In the N = 2-game, IG 2 's overlobbying behavior when 2 = 0 induces the PM to adopt p 2 = 1 with probability less than one when both IGs lobby and the PM grants access to IG 1 , not to IG 2 . In other words, IG 2 's overlobbying behavior creates a negative externality on IG 2 's 2 = 1-self by undermining the PM's belief that 2 = 1 when IG 2 lobbies but is not granted access. The condition stated in proposition 2 is necessary and su¢ cient for the overlobbying externality cost to exceed the agenda constraint cost. It remains to consider the PM. On the one hand, the agenda constraint limits the set of feasible policy choices, imposing a cost on the PM. On the other hand, the PM gets better informed about when N = 1 compared to when N = 2, since the agenda constraint allows the PM to 'discipline' the lobbying behavior of IGs and to prevent overlobbying. In this region of the parameter space, the informational bene…t exceeds the agenda constraint cost, implying the PM is ex ante strictly better o¤ with agenda constraint than without.
EXTENSIONS
This section extends our baseline model in a number of ways. In section 6.1, we extend our analysis to an arbitrary number of issues. In section 6.2, we consider a setting in which the PM has subpoena power. In section 6.3, we discuss brie ‡y endogenizing the set of IGs. Proofs for all extension results are provided in a supplementary online appendix.
More than two issues
In this subsection we will examine whether our main …ndings from section 5 can be extended to more than two issues. We consider a setting where there is an arbitrary but …nite number of issues, I; with one IG on each issue. The PM can reform at most N issues, and can grant access to at most K IGs, where 1 K N I: To keep our analysis tractable we consider a symmetric setting, i.e., we assume that for each IG i , i < 1=2; f i f 2 (0; 1) and i 1: We will focus on the class of symmetric equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which each IG uses identical lobbying strategies, f ( i )g i2f0;1g : The PM's access and policy choices are symmetric with respect to all IGs, i.e., for all i; j such that`i =`j; we have i = j and for all i; j such that`i =`j and a i = a j (and, when a i = a j = 1, i = j ), we have i = j : In a symmetric equilibrium with lobbying strategies f (1); (0)g the probability that an IG lobbies is (1) + (1 ) (0). In addition to this, we impose a reasonable restriction that if PM grants access to IG i and learns i = 1, then he implements reform on issue i ahead of any other issue j to which access was not granted. 33 The following lemma is useful in characterizing the set of symmetric equilibria.
Lemma 3. In any symmetric equilibrium the lobbying strategy must be one of the three types:
1. Truthful lobbying, i.e., (1) = 1; (0) = 0 and hence = ; 2. Overlobbying when i = 0, i.e., (1) = 1; (0) 2 (0; 1) and hence 2 ( ; 1); or 3. Underlobbying when i = 1, i.e.,
(1) 2 (0; 1); (0) = 0 and hence 2 (0; ):
The sketch of proof for the above lemma is as follows. First, observe that IGs never lobbying ( = 0), or always lobbying ( = 1); cannot constitute an equilibrium. In the former case, an IG would prefer to lobby in state 1 since such a deviation will get his reform implemented for sure. In the latter case, the PM's interim belief about a lobbying IG having state 1 must be < 1=2; which means a lobbying IG in state 0 will not get reform implemented; hence, it is better o¤ not lobbying since such a deviation will save on the cost of lobbying. Second, observe that in any symmetric equilibrium, the marginal return to lobbying is strictly greater in state = 1 than in state = 0: This implies that for an IG to be playing a strictly mixed strategy in state 0 (i.e., (0) 2 (0; 1)) it must be indi¤erent between lobbying and not lobbying. In that case, it must be strictly better o¤ lobbying in state 1, and hence we have (1) = 1. Similarly, whenever
(1) 2 (0; 1) it must be that (0) = 0. This means, we cannot have a completely mixed symmetric equilibrium such that both (1) and (0) are in (0; 1):
An important implication of the above lemma is that in any symmetric equilibrium the interim beliefs of the PM must be such that Acc (0) < 1=2 and Acc (1) 1=2: Hence, since Acc (1) = = , we must have
In order to characterize the symmetric equilibria, it is useful to de…ne the following functions z n ( ) and ( ) over 2 (0; 2 ];
and a function e (N; ) over 2 (0; 2 ] and N 2 fK; ; Ig;
Assuming each IG lobbies with probability ; z n ( ) denotes the probability that n out of I 1 groups lobby, and ( ) denotes the probability that a group that lobbies is granted access by the PM. To better understand this expression, note that it is comprised of two terms. The …rst term is the probability that there are less than K lobbying IGs, in which case an IG is granted access for sure. The second term adds up the probabilities associated with there being n + 1(> K) lobbying IGs, in which case each IG has K=(n + 1) probability of being granted access. Consider a candidate symmetric equilibrium of a lobbying game with agenda constraint N in which each IG lobbies with probability : 34 The term e (N; ) denotes the maximal probability that an IG that lobbies gets its issue reformed conditional on it not being granted access by the PM. To understand this expression, note that when there are fewer than N lobbying IGs, the maximal probability of getting reform (conditional on not being granted access) is 1, since Acc (0) 1=2: When there are n + 1(> N ) lobbying IGs, the probability of an IG getting its issue reformed (conditional on not being granted access) depends on how many issues the PM granted access to but chose not to reform, i.e., on the expected number of "vacant" positions which is N minf1; = gK: Hence, each such IG has the maximal probability N minf1; = gK=(n + 1) of getting its issue reformed.
The following lemma provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of the di¤erent types of symmetric lobbying equilibria. To understand the term f (N ), suppose that we are in a symmetric truthful lobbying equilibrium. Suppose an IG were to deviate in state 0 and choose to lobby. Since the PM believes each lobbying IG has state 1, it will get reform implemented with probability [1 ( )] e ( ); which is the probability that it is not granted access times the maximal probability of getting reform conditional on being not granted access. An IG in state 0 will not …nd it pro…table to deviate if the lobbying cost, f , exceeds f (N ): Similarly, f (N ) ( [1 ( )] e ( ) + ( )) is the payo¤ of an IG from lobbying in state 1 in a symmetric truthful lobbying equilibrium. An IG will not …nd it pro…table to deviate to not lobbying in state 1 if the lobbying cost, f , is below f (N ):
Furthermore, it can be shown that both f (N ) and f (N ) are strictly increasing in N with f (K) = 0 and f (I) = 1: Also, for any N 2 fK;
;
] is non-empty. We can then state the following. ; Ig the set of agenda constraints for which a symmetric truthful lobbying equilibrium exists and let N (f ) denote max N (f ). Then, 1. for any f 2 (0; 1); N (f ) is non-empty; 2. moreover, N (f ) is increasing in f with lim f !0 N (f ) = K and lim f !1 N (f ) = I:
As with the two issues model in the previous section, introduction of agenda constraint yields bene…ts and costs. On the bene…t side, as shown in the proposition above, there always exists an agenda constraint that induces full information revelation. On the cost side, agenda constraint reduces the PM's ability to implement welfare improving reform. Can there exist a Pareto improving agenda constraint? Our next example shows that it is indeed possible to introduce an optimal degree of agenda control that leads to Pareto improvement over no agenda constraint.
Example
Suppose there are three issues (I = 3) and the PM can grant access to at most one IG (K = 1); let = 0:4: We consider three possible levels of agenda constraint, with N = 1; 2 or 3; N = 3 corresponding to the absence of an agenda constraint, N = 2 corresponding to an agenda constraint that is less tight than the constraint on access and, …nally, N = 1 corresponding to an agenda constraint as tight as the access constraint. It can then be shown that see that an optimal degree of agenda constraint (N = 2) leads to a strict Pareto improvement as compared to the absence of agenda constraint.
Subpoena power
We now go back to our baseline model with two IGs, and relax the assumption that the PM can grant access only to an IG that did lobby. Speci…cally, we award subpoena power to the PM, allowing him to grant access to any IG, whether this IG did lobby or not. This re ‡ects a practice in several countries, where lawmakers can force people to produce documents or testify in legislative hearings. We are interested in determining whether, and how much, the PM can bene…t from being awarded subpoena power. In the N = 1-game, the PM can already 'discipline' lobbying behavior through his access strategy. From now on, we shall therefore interest ourselves in the N = 2-game.
We start by providing a description of equilibria in the game where the PM has subpoena power.
Lemma 5. Consider the N = 2 game. Suppose that the PM has subpoena power.
1. There exists an equilibrium in which i 2 f0; 1g for each i = 1; 2 if and only There is no other equilibrium in which IGs lobby with positive probability.
Thus, part (1) of lemma 5 identi…es a condition which is necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of an equilibrium in which the PM gets perfectly informed about . Part (2) describes equilibria in the region of the parameter space where overlobbying occurs in the absence of subpoena power.
To go over the intuition underlying lemma 5 we partition the parameter space into three regions, and discuss each region in turn.
First, we consider the region of the parameter space where
Observe that we then have This means that an equilibrium with truthful lobbying exists when the PM does not have subpoena power. In this case, the PM gets perfectly informed about . Part (1) of lemma 5 shows it is no longer true when the PM is awarded subpoena power. This is because in this region, lobbying is relatively costly. When the PM has subpoena power, IGs are then better o¤ abstaining from lobbying and waiting for the PM to subpoena them. This is a strategy that IGs cannot follow when the PM does not have subpoena power. In this region of the parameter space, the PM is thus ex ante strictly worse o¤ with subpoena power than without.
Second, we consider the region of the parameter space where the condition stated in part (1) of lemma 5 is satis…ed. Observe that case 1 of lemma 1 applies again, meaning that, without subpoena power, the PM gets perfectly informed about through truthful lobbying decisions. Part (1) of lemma 5 shows that it is still the case when the PM has subpoena power. Thus, the PM is ex ante as well o¤ with subpoena power as without. The di¤erence with the region of the parameter space we have just discussed above is that lobbying is here less costly, up to the point where IGs are better o¤ lobbying truthfully than hoping for the PM to subpoena them.
Third, we consider the region of the parameter space where 1f1+ 2f2 1 2 < 1. Observe that case 2 of lemma 1, not case 1, now applies. This means that IGs overlobby in the unique equilibrium of the game without subpoena power, and that the PM gets only imperfectly informed about . This opens the possibility that the PM could gain from being awarded subpoena power.
Part (2a) of lemma 5 shows that the strategies 35 and beliefs of the unique equilibrium of the game without subpoena power still constitute an equilibrium of the game with subpoena power. Essentially, this happens because these lobbying strategies prescribe that an IG i does not lobby only if i = 0, meaning that the decision to not lobby already reveals i = 0 and that there is no further information the PM can get by subpoenaing this IG.
Part (2b) of lemma 5 shows that this type of overlobbying equilibrium is no longer unique in the game with subpoena power. Speci…cally, a second type of equilibrium exists in the subregion of the parameter space where 2 1 > 1. In these equilibria, IG 2 follows the same overlobbying strategy as in the equilibrium of the game without subpoena power. However, IG 1 lobbies with a smaller probability (resp. higher probability) when 1 = 1 (resp. 1 = 0). IG 1 's lobbying decisions are therefore less informative than in the overlobbying equilibrium, inducing the PM to subpoena IG 1 with positive probability ( 1 (0;`2) > 0) and forcing him to grant access to IG 2 with smaller probability. In order to prevent IG 2 from overlobbying more, the PM must then adopt p 2 = 1 with lower probability in those cases where IG 2 lobbies but is not granted access ( 2 (1; 0) is smaller than in the equilibrium of the game without subpoena power). Thus, the PM gets less information about than in the unique equilibrium of the game without subpoena power, making him ex ante strictly worse o¤ .
To sum up, in neither of the three regions of the parameter space has the PM anything to gain from being awarded subpoena power. In other words, the PM should choose against being awarded subpoena power.
Our next proposition summarizes the above discussion. Before stating the proposition, we introduce some extra notation. Let EU sub (resp. EU nosub ) denote the PM's highest equilibrium ex ante expected payo¤ in the game with subpoena power (resp. without subpoena power).
Proposition 4. Consider the N = 2 game. We have EU sub EU nosub , with a strict inequality if and only if
Endogenous interest groups
We go back to our baseline model where the PM does not have subpoena power. We now relax the assumption that the set of IGs is exogenously given. Speci…cally, we endogenize the set of IGs by adding to the game a preliminary stage at which IGs decide simultaneously whether to organize. 36 Once made, IGs' organization decisions are observed by all. If IG i decides to organize, it bears a cost c i 0 and gets privately informed about i . We are interested in determining the robustness of our results to endogenizing the set of IGs. 37 Lemma 6 in the supplementary online appendix describes IGs'equilibrium organization strategies. Essentially, it establishes that IG 1 's equilibrium organization strategy is independent of N . This happens because its issue is prioritized, implying that, in every subgame, its expected payo¤ is the same whether N = 1 or N = 2. By contrast, IG 2 's organization strategy is shown to depend on N if and only if IG 1 organizes. 38 Speci…cally, when IG 1 organizes, IG 2 is (weakly) more likely (resp. less likely) to organize when N = 1 than when N = 2 if 
1.
Compared to the case where the set of IGs is exogenous (proposition 2), two conditions are added which impose upper-bounds on the organization costs of the IGs.
The intuition runs as follows. For the introduction of an agenda constraint to generate a Pareto improvement, it must be that the PM gets better informed about when N = 1 than when N = 2. It follows that a Pareto-improving agenda constraint requires that:
1. IG 1 organizes (condition 1). This condition follows because, as we noted above, IG 1 's equilibrium organization strategy is independent of N and IG 2 's equilibrium organization strategy depends on N only if IG 1 organizes. Thus, if IG 1 were to not organize, each player's expected payo¤ would be independent of N , closing the door to the possibility of a Pareto improvement. 2. Either the IGs overlobby in the equilibrium of the N = 2-game or IG 2 is more likely to organize in the N = 1-game than in the N = 2-game (condition 3). This condition follows because, otherwise, the agenda constraint could not generate an informational gain for the PM. 3. IG 2 organizes in the N = 1-game (condition 2). This condition follows because, given conditions 1 and 3, IG 2 's incentives to organize are stronger when N = 1 than when N = 2. In consequence, if IG 2 were to not organize when N = 1, it would not organize either when N = 2. IG 1 would then be the only organized IG, and each player's expected payo¤ would be independent of N , closing again the door to the possibility of a Pareto improvement. To sum up, our result on Pareto-improving agenda constraint is robust to endogenizing the set of IGs, provided it is not too costly for IGs to organize.
CONCLUSION
We develop a model of informational lobbying and access in which a PM faces multiple issues on each of which he can implement a reform. A key feature of our model was that the PM faces resource constraints which inhibit his ability to provide access to IGs and may also restrict his ability to implement reform on all issues. We characterized the equilibrium of the lobbying game and showed that while the act of lobbying can signal pro-reform information, it may not do so perfectly. In particular, when the lobbying costs are not high, an IG may want to lobby the PM even when it does not possess pro-reform information in the hope that the PM is unable to verify the information provided. We then showed that the presence of agenda constraint can improve information transmission by making the disciplining role of access more credible. Indeed, in some cases imposition of an agenda constraint leads to Pareto improvement. Thus, we provide a new rationale for limiting the scope of decision making power of government (what the Economist (2014) article we quote called "Legislative hyperactivism"). The traditional understanding of such constraint is based not on information transmission but rather on wasteful rent seeking and bureaucratic red tape that new legislation inevitably brings. Our work, however, suggests that even in a set up where these sources of ine¢ ciency are absent, the welfare of the decision maker as well as the lobbies can be improved by further constraining the decision maker.
We then extended our model to a more general case of several issues and showed that in such model one can …nd an optimal level of agenda constraint which leads to equilibrium in which the PM is fully informed. Second, we showed that in the baseline, two-issue model, giving PM subpoena power does not lead to improved information transmission. Finally, we also showed that our model is compatible with a more general model in which IGs are endogenously formed or information is endogenously acquired by IGs.
One can extend this line of research into several promising areas. One possibility is to endogenize the agenda and access constraints faced by the PM. For instance, one could allow the PM to optimally allocate his available time between access and policymaking. Another extension worth pursuing is to endogenize the precision of information. In our present model, an IG either chooses not to lobby, or to lobby and perfectly reveal the state of the world to the PM. One could allow lobbying to convey more or less precise signals about the state of the world, where the precision depends on the cost of lobbying. This will give us a richer framework to understand the extent to which IGs disclose information. One could also endogenize the lobbying cost incurred by the IGs via an all-pay auction. Here the magnitude of lobbying cost incurred could potentially signal the precision of available information. We leave these extensions for future work. We then get that ( We prove part (2) of the statement. Suppose that 1f1+ 2f2 1 2 < 1. We proceed in several steps.
First, we establish that
In all three cases,
> 0 contradicts i (1) = 0.
Third, we establish that < 1. For the game with agenda constraint, equilibrium lobbying and posterior beliefs are thus as described in the previous case. For the game without agenda constraint, we know from lemma 1 that, in equilibrium, IGs overlobby. It follows that N =2 i (1; 0) 2 [1=2; 1) for each i = 1; 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. We start by establishing the su¢ ciency of the condition in the statement of proposition 2. Observe that this condition, together with > 1, implies 1f1+ 2f2 1 2 < 1 and f 2 < 1 1 . Thus, case 2 of lemma 1 and case 2 of lemma 2 apply.
In the N = 1-game, equilibrium lobbying is truthful and the PM prioritizes issue 1. The PM chooses p = (1; 0) when = (1; 1). He chooses p = otherwise. Players'expected payo¤s are then given by
In the N = 2-game, IGs overlobby in equilibrium. Given the strategies and beliefs described in the statement and the proof of lemma 1, we get that players' We now establish the necessity of the condition in the statement of proposition 2. Suppose EU
for every player k 2 f1; 2; P M g, with at least one inequality strict.
We start by observing that we must have 
